Contents

REFEREED ARTICLES

Edward Barkin
Relative Phenomenalism: Toward a More Plausible Theory of Mind  abstract
Georg Northoff
Qualia and Ventral Prefrontal Cortical Function: ‘Neurophenomenological’ Hypothesis  abstract

CONTINUING DEBATE AND OPINION

V.S. Ramachandran and Edward M. Hubbard 
The Phenomenology of Synaesthesia  full text
William I. Thompson
Literary and Archetypal Mathematical Mentalities In the Evolution of Culture  first paragraph

CONFERENCE REPORTS

Roger G. Uchtmann
Visions of the Emerald Beyond: Report of the Lucerne Conference 2003
Bill Faw
Models and Mechanisms of Consciousness: Report of ASSC 7 Conference, Memphis 2003

BOOK REVIEWS

Bruno Deschênes
Robert J. Zatorre & Isabelle Peretz, The Biological Foundations of Music
Greg Nixon
Christian de Quincey, Radical Nature: Discovering the Soul of Matter
John Pickering
Thomas C. Dalton, Becoming John Dewey: Dilemmas of a Philosopher and Naturalist

ABSTRACTS

Edward Barkin

Relative Phenomenalism: Toward a More Plausible Theory of Mind

Abstract: Most philosophers believe that qualitative states must be explained in terms of physical states of the brain in order to resolve the mind/ body problem. But the severe difficulties involved in deriving the mental from the physical or, even more bizarrely, eliminating the mental altogether, have caused some to seriously investigate Russell’s longstanding ideas about the intrinsic nature of physical entities. The resulting microphenomenal approaches, however, are of necessity extremely vague and complicated. Consequently, a macrophenomenal theory of mind may well be a more plausible alternative than microphenomenal ones — especially if it takes into account the relative aspect of experience and thereby avoids reifying qualia.

Correspondence: Edward Barkin, 8 East 83rd Street #7G, New York, NY 10028, U.S.A. Email: EdBarkin@aol.com


Georg Northoff

Qualia and the Ventral Prefrontal Cortical Function: ‘Neurophenomenological’ Hypothesis

Abstract: The exact relationship between qualia and the function of the brain remains elusive. The present approach focuses on the linkage between the neural mechanisms of the brain and the phenomenological and epistemological mechanisms of qualia. It is hypothesized that distinct characteristics of the ventral prefrontal cortical function may be crucial for the generation of these phenomenological and epistemological mechanisms — this is reflected in the so-called ‘neurophenomenological hypothesis’.

The ‘phenomenological–qualitative’ character of qualia may be related with an early activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). The experience of ‘presence’ in qualia may be accounted for by a co-activation in both VMPFC and hippocampus and a concurrent deactivation in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and posterior cingulate. Past and future temporal dimensions may therefore be integrated within the experience of events, which in turn may account for the phenomenal characteristics of ‘presence’ and thus ‘phenomenal time’. ‘Non-structural homogeneity’ in the experience of qualia may be accounted for by either ‘supramodal character’ or ‘modality unspecifity’ of the VMPFC. The ‘heterogenous’ stimuli can therefore be included and integrated within one ‘homogenous’ event as experienced in qualia. Finally, ‘transparency’ in the experience of qualia may be related with the ‘reciprocal suppression’ between VMPFC and VLPFC. Simultaneous cognitive processing during the experience of qualia may be suppressed and may consequently account for their transparent character.

Due to several methodological limitations, these ‘neurophenomenological hypotheses’ must be considered as preliminary. However, they may nevertheless serve as a starting point for the development of a more elaborate neuroscientific hypothesis of qualia in the future.

Correspondence: Georg Northoff, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Kirstein Building KS 454, 330 Brookline Ave, Boston, MA 02215, USA.  Email: gnorthof@caregroup.harvard.edu


William Irwin Thompson

Literary and Archetypal Mathematical Mentalities In the Evolution of Culture

The idea of cultural mentalities first arose in European anthropology’s confrontation with global primitive cultures. During the early twentieth century’s period of confident imperialism, the European nations articulated their confrontation with non-literate cultures in a poetic imagining of the ‘primitive’ as a Romantic ‘Other’. As psychology developed in Europe to explore the unconscious as well as madness, a new ethnology also sought to enter into the mind of the primitive as an exotic place where logic and reason did not rule. [snip]

Correspondence:
W.I. Thompson, P.O. Box 381561, Cambridge, MA. 02238, U.S.A. Email: Lndsfrn@aol.com


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