Contents

Vol. 14, No.11, November 2007

Refereed Papers

David Berman and William Lyons   abstract
The First Modern Battle for Consciousness: J.B. Watson’s Rejection of Mental Images
William S. Robinson   abstract
Evolution and Epiphenomenalism
Elske Straver    abstract
Empathy and Propositional Knowledge
Aaron Zimmerman   abstract
The Nature of Belief

Conference Report

Bill Faw   full text
‘And the Danube Ran Through It’ — Review of TSC 2007, Budapest

Opinion Piece

William I. Thompson   full text
Natural Drift and the Evolution of Culture

Book Reviews
   full text

Susan Blackmore
Sergio Della Sala (ed.), Tall Tales about the Mind and Brain: Separating Fact from Fiction
Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (ed.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion
Gregory Nixon
Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme
Paul Marshall
Edward F. Kelly, et al., Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century 

ABSTRACTS

David Berman and William Lyons

The First Modern Battle for Consciousness: J.B. Watson’s Rejection of Mental Images*

Abstract: This essay investigates the influences that led J.B. Watson to change from being a student in an introspectionist laboratory at Chicago to being the founder of systematic (or radical) behaviourism. Our focus is the crucial period, 1913–1914, when Watson struggled to give a convincing behaviourist account of mental imaging, which he considered to be the greatest obstacle to his behaviourist programme. We discuss in detail the evidence for and against the view that, at least eventually, Watson rejected outright the very existence of mental images. We also discuss in detail whether or not Knight Dunlap was the crucial influence on his eventual rejection of mental images. Finally we consider whether Watson’s rejection of mental images was bolstered by some personal incapacity as regards imaging or whether his rejection was more like a form of ‘ideological blindness’.

Correspondence: David Berman and William Lyons, Trinity College Dublin, College Green, Dublin 2, Ireland. wlyons@tcd.ie

William S. Robinson

Evolution and Epiphenomenalism

Abstract: This paper addresses the question whether evolutionary principles are compatible with epiphenomenalism, and argues for an affirmative answer. A general summary of epiphenomenalism is provided, along with certain specifications relevant to the issues of this paper. The central argument against compatibility is stated and rebutted. A specially powerful version of the argument, due to William James (1890), is stated. The apparent power of this argument is explained as resulting from a problem about our understanding of pleasure and an equivocation on ‘explanation’. Finally, an argument by Plantinga (2004), which applies to beliefs rather than phenomenal qualities, is stated and rebutted.
Keywords: William James, phenomenal qualities, Alvin Plantinga, pleasure, semantic epiphenomenalism

Correspondence: William S. Robinson, Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011, USA. wsrob@iastate.edu

Elske Straver

Empathy and Propositional Knowledge

Abstract: Empathy is often described as an evolutionary tool that helps humans manoeuvre between the complexities of our social hierarchy. As it allows us to understand other people’s intentions, it is often categorized as an element of social cognition that can lead to a form of know-how. This paper will argue that empathy can lead to more than know-how. Using data from psychology and neuroscience, I will sketch empathizing as a reliable process. On the assumption of reliabilism, I will show that empathizing as a generally reliable process can produce justified beliefs and thus that the empathizing process can lead to propositional knowledge. In passing I shall reveal some flaws in an influential line of research on empathy in psychology, which in turn exposes a more fundamental, conceptual, problem with empirical research on empathy.

Correspondence: estraver@ucalgary.ca

Aaron Zimmerman

The Nature of Belief

Abstract: Neo-Cartesian approaches to belief place greater evidential weight on a subject’s introspective judgments than do neo-behaviorist accounts. As a result, the two views differ on whether our absent-minded and weak-willed actions are guided by belief. I argue that simulationist accounts of the concept of belief are committed to neo-Cartesianism, and, though the conceptual and empirical issues that arise are inextricably intertwined, I discuss experimental results that should point theory-theorists in that direction as well. Belief is even less closely connected to behaviour than most contemporary functionalists allow.

Correspondence: Aaron Z. Zimmerman, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA. Email: azimmerman@philosophy.ucsb.edu

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