The following papers (on the self) were accepted before the special issue editors were appointed:
JCS, 5 (2), 1998, pp.166-184
Burns, T.R., Uppsala Theory Circle, Department of Sociology, PO
Box 821, University of Uppsala, SE-751 08 Uppsala, SWEDEN tom.burns@soc.uu.se
Engdahl, E., engdahl@kvac.uu.se
From a sociological and social psychological perspective, this paper
outlines and develops a theoretical framework with which to define and
analyse consciousness, emphasizing the role of language, collective representations,
conceptions of self, and self-reflectivity in human conscious phenomena.
The paper focuses on the social origins of conscious phenomena, on collective
as well as individual levels. Part 1 of the paper (Burns and Engdahl, 1998a)
dealt with collective consciousness. This second part analyses individual
consciousness as arising in the context of a person experiencing herself
as an object of collective representation and collective reflection and
discourse. Individual consciousness is the outcome of processes of collective
naming, classifying, monitoring, judging, reflecting on, and conducting
discussions and discourses about, the individual herself. A participant
learns in the collective context (in line with George Herbert Mead's earlier
formulations) a naming and classification of herself (self-description
and identity), of her judgments, actions, and predispositions. In acquiring
a language and conceptual framework for this mode of activity -- along
with experience and skills in reflective discussion -- she develops a capability
of inner reflection and inner dialogue about self, which are characteristic
features of individual consciousness. The analysis goes on to distinguish
multiple modes of individual awareness and consciousness, distinguishing
awareness from consciousness proper, and also identifying pre- and sub-conscious
levels. This points up the complexity of the human mind, in part its elaboration
through processes of social interaction and construction.
JCS, 5 (2),1998, pp.132-140
Butterworth, G., Department of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, East Sussex BN1 9QU, UK scfa1@sussex.ac.uk
Galen Strawson (1997) considers the self to be best described as a cognitive,
`distinctively mental' phenomenon. He asserts that the mental sense of
self comes to every normal human being in childhood and comprises the sense
of being a mental presence, of being alone in one's head, with the body
`just a vehicle or vessel for the mental thing that is what one really
or most essentially is' (p. 407). His thesis is determinedly cognitivist
(although not naively so) and it is with this that I take issue. As Reed
(1994) puts the problem, `cognitivism, with its allegiance to the representational
theory of mind and its focus on mental states as internal to the mind,
is particularly susceptible to the dualistic separation of self from the
environment' (p. 278). One may add that cognitivism is also susceptible
to separating the self from the body. Reed suggests that perception not
only provides information for the distinction between self and environment
from the outset, but also it provides a means of keeping in contact with
the world. Memory provides a means of bridging earlier and later aspects
of self and integrating diverse elements of experience. Both perceiving
and remembering entail aspects of self but in rather different ways. Perceiving
is a spatio-temporal process which provides a continuous flow of information
about the embodied self in its encounters with the physical and social
world. Autobiographical memory requires a duplication of the self so that
`me-experiencing-now' can be related with `a prior me-experiencing-a-prior-environment'.
The question of interest is how a perceived self may, through development,
give rise to a remembered self.
JCS, 5 (2),1998, pp.185-201
Forman, R.K., Program in Religion, Hunter College, CUNY, 695 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10021, USA RForman383@aol.com
One of the most exciting aspects of this journal, of which I am proud
to be an executive editor, is that it has become a venue in which so many
distinct fields can interact on a single question, that of consciousness.
I know of no other question, or journal, which has brought together so
many voices, from so many fields, to swirl around a single topic. It is
exciting both to provide a forum and to be a part of this debate. In this
article I would like to bring the findings of my somewhat unusual but increasingly
accepted field -- mysticism-- to the discussion, for I think they may offer
some helpful insights about consciousness. Why? When a biologist seeks
to understand a complex phenomenon, one key strategy is to look to at it
in its simplest form. Probably the most famous is the humble bacterium
E. coli. Its simple gene structure has allowed us to understand much of
the gene functioning of complex species. Similarly many biologists have
turned to the `memory' of the simple sea slug to understand our own more
kaleidoscopic memory. Freud and Durkheim both used totemism, which they
construed as the simplest form of religion, to understand the complexities
of religious life. The methodological principle is: to understand something
complex turn to its simple forms. Full
Text
JCS, 5 (2),1998, pp.224-234
James, C.A., Dept. of Philosophy, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, USA cajames@vm.sc.edu
The philosophical study of irrationality can yield interesting insights
into the human mind. One provocative issue is self-defeating behaviours,
i.e. behaviours that result in failure to achieve one's apparent goals
and ambitions. In this paper I consider a self-defeating behaviour called
choking under pressure, explain why it should be considered irrational,
and how it is best understood with reference to skills. Then I describe
how choking can be explained without appeal to a purely Freudian subconscious
or `sub-agents' view of mind. Finally, I will recommend an alternative
way to understand self-defeating behaviour which comes from a synthesis
of Peter Strawson's explanation of `self-reactive attitudes', Mark Johnston's
notion of -`mental tropisms', and revised Freudian descriptions of the
causes of self-defeating behaviour.
JCS, 5 (2),1998, pp.141-152
Laycock, S.W., Dept. of Philosophy, University of Toledo, Toledo,
OH 43606, USA. slaycoc@pop3.utoledo.edu
For better or for worse, I find myself in the company of the `misers' of Galen Strawson's portrayal who, in response to the question, `Is there such a thing as the self?' rejoin: `Well, there is something of which the sense of the self is an accurate representation, but it does not follow that there is any such thing as the self' (Strawson, 1997, p. 410). Far from representing a form of `metaphysical excess' (ibid.), the rejoinder seems faithfully and reliably phenomenological. We need not assume that reflection (`self'-reflection) is mere fabrication, or that it crucially distorts the thematic posit that funds our sense of self. The focus, recognition and contextual sensitivity that condition perception may, and admittedly do, limit and modify the activity of reflection as well. Observation disturbs the observed. And likewise, reflection may well compromise its object. But the product of this `compromise', the object as disturbed, the reflective posit as distorted, is nonetheless `there', for reflection. If the way a given object appears to us is a function of our perspectival insertion into the visible world, we need not deny that the world still appears to us in just this way. And analogously, our `sense of self' may represent -- in fact, faithfully represent -- the resultant `distortion', but it would be a breach of logic to infer from this that our `sense of self' therefore represents a self untouched by distortion, an independent, `undistorted' self. Indeed, if reflection distorts, we would have no reflective access to an undistorted self, and would thus have no phenomenological warrant for assuming its existence. Pace Strawson, however, the `something' represented by our `sense of self' is not some thing. It is not `as much a thing or object as any . . . grain of salt' (p. 425), but rather, as we shall see, an atmospheric haze, or at best, an adventitious `sheen'.
JCS, 5 (2), 1998, pp.202-223
Watson, R., Sociology Department, Coupland II Building, University of Manchester, M13 9PL, U.K.
In this paper I shall outline the approach to consciousness adopted
by ethnomethodology and its `associate' conversation(al) analysis. I shall
attempt to do this by taking a minimalist stance, namely a basic formulation
of the elements of these approaches, trying to strip away the ornate superstructures
which have been erected upon that basis. I shall proceed in two ways. First,
I shall seek to define ethnomethodology and conversation analysis by contrasting
them to varying degrees with a variety of other approaches: symbolic interactionism
and, derivatively, the work of Goffman, the -social psychology of Rom Harré
and his associates and with Norbert Wiley. Secondly, I shall give some
examples of the use of the notion of `self' held by ethnomethodologists
and conversation analysts that take a definitive turn towards a non-ironic,
non-mentalist, non-essentialist and non-cognitivist approach to knowledge,
consciousness and self.
JCS, 5 (2),1998, pp.153-165
Wilkes, K.V., St Hilda's College, Oxford OX4 1DY, U.K.
The burden of this article is that although the idea of `the self' which
Galen Strawson decribes in his target article is initially very attractive,
it eventually doesn't work. There is a lot of competition for a `pole position'
notion -- `human', `person', psuche, `soul', even `sake' -- and the idea
of `self' does not seem to deserve the prize. What Strawson wants to do
with the notion of a `self' can be done equally well, and more economically,
by the first-person pronoun. A question raised repeatedly is: `What is
a self worth wanting?' Perhaps the greatest area of disagreement with Strawson's
article is with his idea that `the self' needs to have little or nothing
to do with time-related plans and emotions: guilt and remorse; pride; hope
and expectation; career choices . . . even such apparently mundane things
as pension-plans -- in fact, any long-term forward- or backward-looking
psychological phenomena. The question of realism (about `the self') is
pressed.
JCS, 5 (2),1998, pp.235-245
Sutherland, J.K.B., Imprint Academic, PO Box 1, Thorverton EX5 5YX, UK, keith@imprint.co.uk
Review article based on Anne Glyn-Jones, 'Holding up a Mirror: how civilizations decline'. Full Text